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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL 0. ECKARD and ] 
MARILYN J. ECKARD, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
GALE G. SMITH and 
JOY T. SMITH, his wife, ] 
Defendants-Appellants. 
I Case No. 14153 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondents were originally granted specific perform-
ance in December, 1973 by the lower court for the sale of one-
half of a duplex to them, and they received a deed to the sub-
ject property from Appellants in January, 1974. In October, 
1974, this Court, in a 3 to 2 decision, reversed the lower 
court on the ground that the contract was not sufficiently 
definite to allow specific performance. After remittitur to 
the lower court, Appellants moved for restitution of the pre-
mises. Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the issues had been rendered moot by Appellants1 own acts 
before and after filing their notice of appeal. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that the issues were moot 
and denied Appellants1 motions for restitution and damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request this Court to sustain the 
summary judgment awarded them by the lower court on May 13, 
1975. . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents state the facts upon which the lower 
court based its summary judgment because many of the relevant 
facts which show mootness are omitted from Appellants' brief. 
The facts are divided into numbered paragraphs for convenience. 
1. After hearing the witnesses and reviewing the 
evidence, the lower court in December, 1973 decreed that 
Respondents were entitled to specific performance for con-
veyance of one-half of a duplex and that they had to exercise 
their option to purchase within 25 days after judgment. 
(R. 109-11). 
2. The lower court's decision does not specify 
how the option was to be exercised. (R. 109) . In fact, 
Appellants set the terms for exercising the option. (R. 71). 
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3. The lower court's decision does not require 
or even mention a party-wall agreement. (R. 109). 
4. When the end of the 25 day period was approach-
ing, Respondents asked Appellants for an extension of time 
in which to obtain the money to make the purchase, but Ap-
pellants refused. In fact, Appellants insisted that Res-
pondents pay by cash or cashier's check rather than personal 
check. (R. 71)... (Respondents were unable to obtain a con-
ventional home loan because Appellants refused at that time 
to execute a party-wall agreement). 
5. As a result of Appellants' insistence, Res-
pondents were required to secure a loan from a personal friend 
and to deliver to Appellants a cashier's check in the amount 
of $37,744.02 in full payment for their one-half of the duplex 
on Friday, January 4, 1974 because they could not obtain a 
cashier's check at any later time to comply with the 25 day 
requirement. (R. 71). This payment occurred six days before 
Appellants filed their notice of appeal. (See R. 107). 
6. In anticipation of the payment, Appellants had 
already completed a warranty deed to Respondents on January 
3, 1974. (R. 98-100). 
7. Appellants accepted the said cashier's check 
on January 4, 1974 and delivered to Respondents the said 
warranty deed signed by Appellants and notarized by their 
attorney. (R. 89, 100). 
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8. Appellants' attorney also signed a receipt that 
the said cashier's check was received "in full and complete 
payment for one-half (1/2) of the duplex . . ." (R. 42; 
see R. 89 (Affidavit of Appellant's attorney)). 
9. Both Appellants endorsed the said cashier's 
check and voluntarily cashed it several weeks after they had 
filed their appeal. (R. 71; see copy of check R. 40-41). 
10. No Writ of Execution or other supplemental pro-
ceedings were ever instituted by Respondents against Appellants. 
11. At the time of the sale to Respondents, Appel-
lants did not: 
(a) Attempt to stay the sale as provided 
in Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by filing a supersedeas bond; 
(b) Reserve any right or claim under the 
litigation; 
(c) Protest the sale; or 
(d) Take any other preventive action. 
12. Appellants did not file their Notice of Appeal 
until six days after they had conveyed the property to 
Respondents. (See R. 107). 
13. Almost two weeks after filing their Notice of 
Appeal, Appellants executed a party-wall agreement dated 
January 22, 1974, which states that the "Eckards [Respondents] 
are owners in fee" of one-half of the duplex, and requested 
Respondents to sign it. The said party-wall agreement had 
been prepared by Appellants' attorney who notarized their 
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signatures. (R. 43-46; see R. 90). 
14. Respondents did not sign the party-wall agreement 
submitted by Appellants because Appellants were then negotiating 
to sell the other half of the duplex to the Townsends. (R. 71). 
15. On February 5, 1974 several weeks after filing 
their Notice of Appeal, Appellants sold the other half of the 
duplex to the Townsends. (R. 71). 
16. As a condition of the sale to the Townsends, 
Appellants required the Townsends to execute a party-wall 
agreement with Respondents on February 5, 1974. (R. 71-72; 
see R. 47-50). 
17. The cashier's check from Respondents to 
Appellants was negotiated by Appellants after February 5, 
1974. (R. 71; see R. 40-41). 
18. Because Respondents had declined to execute 
the party-wall agreement prepared by Appellants' attorney, 
Appellants had, on January 30, 19 74 moved the lower court 
for an order setting aside their conveyance to Respondents. 
(R. 98). Appellants were then complaining to the lower 
court that the basis of their motion to set aside the con-
veyance was not because they had been forced to convey but 
because Respondents had not complied with the judgment! 
(R. 101, 98). 
19. After the party-wall agreement between the 
Townsends and Respondents was executed, Appellant's attorney 
told the lower court on or about February 19, 1974 that the 
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matter had been "resolved and settled", and as a result the 
lower court denied Appellants' motion to set aside the con-
veyance to Respondents. (R. 98, which shows the notation 
thereon by Judge Croft? see minute entry, R. 103). 
20. Upon the original appeal the majority of this 
Court expressly declined to consider the mootness issue 
(R.82) and did not order restitution although empowered to do 
so under Rule 76(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The dissent argued that the issues had been mooted. (R. 82-
83) • 
21. After remittitur and after reviewing the 
record and hearing the arguments on mootness the lower court 
granted summary judgment to Respondents but inadvertently 
signed the wrong summary judgment form. (See R. 8). The 
lower court executed and filed the correct judgment on May 
13, 1975. (R. 28). 
A R G U M E N T 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENTS ON 
THE ISSUE OF MOOTNESS AND PROPERLY 
DENIED APPELLANTS1 MOTIONS FOR RES-
TITUTION AND DAMAGE. 
This Court has held that when a party "acquiesces 
in a judgment against him he thereby waives his right to have 
said judgment reviewed on appeal." Ottenheimer, et alv, v. 
Mountain States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 Pac.1117, 1118 (1920) 
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Although the present appeal contests the lower court's dec-* 
ision of mootness, the facts of the Ottenheimer case are in 
point and the above stated principle is applicable because 
the facts upon which mootness is based all occurred prior 
to the hearing of the initial appeal. In Ottenheimer, the 
defendant-appellant vacated certain property pursuant to an 
order of the lower court but in doing so served a written 
notice on respondent stating that it was vacating the prop-
erty pursuant to the order but was not waiving any of its 
claims. This Court dismissed the appeal in Ottenheimer in 
spite of the written notice that the defendant-appellant 
was not waiving its claims. 
In the instant case, Respondents brought no process 
to enforce their judgment, and thus Appellants were not forced 
into conveying the property or accepting payment. In fact, 
Appellants set the terms, insisted on a cash payment and 
acknowledged that the cashier's check was in "full and com-
plete payment". Moreover, when payment was made Appellants 
indicated no intent to preserve their rights to appeal and took 
no action to preserve those rights-they filed no supersedeas 
bond, they requested no stay; on the contrary, they demanded 
performance within the twenty-five day period set by the court 
and refused to accept less than cash in payment. As is stated 
in the Facts, Respondents were forced to take extraordinary 
measures to comply with the terms set by Appellants. See 
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Golden Spike Equipment Co. v. Croshaw, 16 Utah 2d 391, 401 
P.2d 949, 951 (1965), wherein this Court indicated that 
there should be an evident intention to preserve an appeal 
at the time a judgment is satisfied. 
Appellants were at all times pertinent hereto re-
presented by counsel who was even asked if he wanted his name 
on the check paid to Appellants. If Appellants wanted to 
protect their interests on appeal they could and should 
have filed a notice of appeal, requested a stay of the 
judgment or filed a supersedeas bond before demanding and 
accepting a full cash payment and delivering their deed. 
Appellant's actions in the period following judgment both 
before and after filing their notice of appeal are an ir-
revocable waiver of their claims. 
On the question of mootness, some courts have 
distinguished between acts occurring before appeal and those 
occurring after. In our case, Appellants took voluntary 
actions contradictory to their position both before and after 
filing their notice of appeal. Such prior or subsequent 
actions taken separately should be sufficient to render 
Appellants' claims moot. When such actions are combined, 
the issue must be.conclusively moored. It would be inequitable 
indeed if Appellants could set the terms, demand and receive 
a cashier's check in full payment for the property in dispute, 
voluntarily cash the check several weeks after filing their 
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notice of appeal, thereafter tell the lower court that the 
issue had been "resolved and settled", and then claim they 
are entitled to restitution. 
Further, for Appellants' benefit, Respondents 
executed a party-wall agreement after the appeal had been 
filed so that Appellants could sell the other one-half of the 
duplex to the Townsends. All of Appellants' actions in regard 
to the sale to Respondents and the Townsends contradict any 
further claims Appellants now assert. A case becomes moot 
when by an act of the parties the controversy has come to an 
end. Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970). 
A moot question is one that existed but because of the 
happening of certain events has ceased to exist. Harvey 
v, Cahill, 206 N.E.2d 500 (111. App.). 
In the instant case, the Affidavit of Appellants' 
attorney contained in the file (R. 89) establishes most of 
the facts to show mootness. Moreover, the lower court dis-
missed Appellants' motion to set aside the conveyance to 
Respondents because Appellants' attorney told the lower 
court long after the appeal had been filed that the matter 
had been "resolved and settled". 
After remittitur the question of mootness was placed 
directly before the lower court. Mootness, as grounds for 
dismissal, is discussed in 6A Moore's Federal Practice Section 
57.13 as follows: 
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"I 
One or more of the issues involved in an 
action may become moot prior to or during 
the trial of the action in the lower court. 
In this event the trial court should refuse 
to make an adjudiciation of the moot issue(s). 
If the non-mooted issues that remain are suf-
ficient so that the action itself remains 
justiciable then the trial court properly 
proceeds to adjudicate those issues; but if 
the mooted issues are controlling the trial 
court should dismiss the action . . . 
Respondents do not contest the right of restitution 
in a proper case when process has issued to enforce a sale or 
judgment. See Rule 76 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. How-
ever, the parties in the present case voluntarily entered into 
a contract for the "full and complete" payment of cash for
 ( 
the property which payment became final upon acceptance and ' 
delivery of the warranty deed, all of which Appellants later j 
confirmed by voluntarily cashing the cashier's check long 
after they had appealed. I 
It is clear from the cases cited in Appellants1 
brief that the facts of each case determine whether restitution • 
is proper. In Holmes v. Williams, 273 P.2d 931 (Cal. 1954), I 
cited by Appellants, the court held that restitution will be 
allowed only if it is not inequitable and the parties have * J 
not contracted that payment be final. In the instant case, . 
all actions, were taken at the direction of Appellants, and • 
the payment was acknowledged by Appellants as "full and j 
complete". It is submitted that under the facts of this case, 
i 
i 
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the acts of Appellants were voluntary, payment was final, the 
issues are moot, and restitution would be inequitable- The 
principle stated in the Ottenheimer case is applicable to this 
case. 
Appellants also claim damages for unlawful detainer. 
Under no circumstance in the instant case would Appellants 
be entitled to damages. There was nothing in the lower 
court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment in 
regard to unlawful detainer. No issue of unlawful detainer was-
raised in any of the points stated in Appellant's original 
brief to this Court. There was no discussion whatever by 
this Court in regard to unlawful detainer in its initial 
opinion. Appellants did not petition for rehearing as to 
that matter after the initial decision by this Court was 
rendered. Appellants thus have no basis for claiming such 
damages. 
£ 2. E C L U £3 !I 0 N 
Appellants demanded and received full cash pay-
ment from Respondents. Appellants set the conditions upon 
which payment was required and voluntarily cashed the check 
and insisted on the party-wall agreement long after filing 
their appeal. It is clear that the issues have been rendered 
moot and that Appellants are not equitably entitled to 
restitution or damages. The judgment granted Respondents 
should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
WATKINS & FABER 
Walter P. Faber, Jr. 
David Lloyd 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered three copies of 
the foregoing Brief to Richard W. Perkins, attorney for 
Defendants-Appellants, 2525 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this j <j M day of September, 1975. 
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